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Objective:  The  optimal  organisation  of  emergency  and  urgent  care  services  (EUCS)  is a perennial  problem
internationally.  Similar  to other  countries,  the Health  Service  Executive  in  Ireland  pursued  EUCS  recon-
ﬁguration  in  response  to  quality  and  safety  concerns,  unsustainable  costs  and workforce  issues.  However,
the implementation  of reconﬁguration  has  been  inconsistent  at a  regional  level.  Our  aim  was  to  identify
the  factors  that  led  to this  inconsistency.
Methods:  Using  a multiple  case  study  design,  six  case study  regions  represented  full, partial  and  little/no
reconﬁguration  at emergency  departments  (EDs).  Data  from  documents  and  key  stakeholder  interviews
were  analysed  using  a framework  approach  with  cross-case  analysis.
Results:  The  impetus  to  reconﬁgure  ED  services  was  triggered  by  patient  safety  events,  and  to a lesser
extent  by  having  a  region-speciﬁc  plan and  an  obvious  starting  point  for changes.  However,  the complex-
ity  of the next  steps  and  political  inﬂuence  impeded  reconﬁguration  in  several  regions.  Implementation
was  more  strategic  in  regions  that  reconﬁgured  later,  facilitated  by  clinical  leadership  and  “lead-in  time”
to plan  and  sell  changes.
Conclusion: While  the  global  shift  towards  centralisation  of  EUCS  is  driven  by  universal  challenges,  deci-
sions  about  when,  where  and how  much  to implement  are  inﬂuenced  by  local  drivers  including  context,
people  and  politics.  This  can contribute  to  a public  perception  of inequity  and  distrust  in  proposals  for
major  systems  change.
©  2019  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V. This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
The reconﬁguration of hospital services is a global trend. It is
deﬁned as a “. . .deliberately induced change of some signiﬁcance
in the distribution of medical, surgical, diagnostic and ancillary
specialties” available in each hospital or other acute care units in
a locality, region or healthcare administrative area [1 p129]. It is
characterised by the centralisation of specialist services at fewer
hospitals, serving a higher volume of patients. Reconﬁguration has
been pursued in several countries including Canada [2], the United
Kingdom [1,3,4], the Netherlands [5] and Scandinavian countries
[6,7] across a range of clinical services. Emergency and urgent care
services (EUCS) are among the most commonly reconﬁgured ser-
vices [3].
∗ Corresponding author at: School of Public Health, University College Cork, West-
ern  Rd, Cork, Ireland.
E-mail address: s.mchugh@ucc.ie (S. McHugh).
In Ireland, EUCS reconﬁguration was  a pillar of a 2006 system-
wide policy to reorganise healthcare delivery in the then newly
established Health Service Executive (HSE) [8]. The HSE is respon-
sible for the management and delivery of public health care in
the Republic of Ireland, including the delivery of most urgent and
emergency care through acute hospital emergency departments
(EDs), acute assessment units and minor injury units across pub-
lic and voluntary hospitals. The number of emergency admissions
has increased by almost 1000 per annum in Ireland over the last
ten years from 32,000 in 2005 to 41,500 in 2016, an increase of
approximately 30% [9]. Prior to EUCS reconﬁguration, 35 hospitals
across Ireland operated full 24/7 emergency departments. Thus,
part of the transformation programme involved consolidating 24/7
emergency departments (EDs) across regions, centralising complex
care to larger tertiary hospitals and closing or “re-designating” the
function of EDs at smaller hospitals from full 24/7 services to urgent
care centres and local injury units. Centres of differing capacity and
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2019.05.018
0168-8510/© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
0/).
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capabilities were intended to work together to create a hub and
spoke network of emergency care across a geographical region.
The main drivers of reconﬁguration are cost, workforce (espe-
cially the need to recruit and retain specialists), and concerns about
the safety of low volume units [1,10,11]. Research on the effective-
ness of reconﬁguration in dealing with these challenges is mixed
and contested [3,12]. A 2015 review of 123 proposed reconﬁgu-
ration projects in the UK found no evidence of signiﬁcant savings
resulting from reconﬁguration [10]. There is little evidence on the
use of reconﬁguration to reduce workforce difﬁculties. There is
some evidence that high volume centres are associated with better
outcomes for trauma [13], stroke care [14,15] and critical care for
conditions including severe sepsis and respiratory diagnoses [16],
as well as procedures including abdominal aortic aneurysm repair,
colorectal cancer surgery and pancreatic surgery [17–19]. The mag-
nitude of the association varies across conditions and the clinical
and policy signiﬁcance of the volume-outcome relationship is com-
plicated by the methodological shortcomings of primary studies
[12,20]. Access has been a notably absent as a driver in reconﬁgu-
ration proposals [10]. Arguments against reconﬁguration focus on
the potential negative impact on access, health service utilisation
and patient outcomes in certain circumstances [21–23].
As in other countries, the stated reasons for focusing on EUCS
reconﬁguration in Irish policy documents are cost, workforce,
and safety, while access concerns are cited as a major barrier to
reconﬁguration [24]. Qualitative research with Irish stakeholders
has found that different stakeholder groups use different lines
of argument for and against EUCS reconﬁguration. Clinicians and
management largely propose arguments in favour based on patient
safety, workforce; and efﬁciency claims in the wake of the economic
recession. External stakeholders, including hospital campaigners
and local political representatives, typically focus on access to care
in arguments against reconﬁguration [24]. Despite the high level of
consensus among internal health service stakeholders in Ireland,
to date, there has been inconsistent implementation of reconﬁgu-
ration across regions.
Our aim was to examine the factors that have led to this vari-
ation, identifying the factors that inﬂuenced the initial decision
to reconﬁgure services, and the factors that shaped the imple-
mentation approach and spread of reconﬁguration. We used a
conceptual framework outlining the key components of major sys-
tems change and how they interact to inﬂuence implementation
[25]. This framework has been used to examine the centralisation
of acute stroke services in the UK but to the best of our knowl-
edge, it has not been applied to major systems changes in other
jurisdictions.
2. Methods
2.1. Design
We  used a multiple case study design analysing data from inter-
views and documents collected as part of a large qualitative study
which was approved by two Research Ethics Committees in Ireland.
All interview participants provided written consent.
Drawing on the aforementioned conceptual framework for
major systems change [25], we focused on the initial decision to
reconﬁgure EUCS in particular regions, and the subsequent spread
of reconﬁguration. While there is no universally accepted deﬁnition
of ‘spread’ or ‘scale-up’ [26], the terms broadly refer to the delib-
erate expansion of a policy or programme to other health service
delivery units (hospitals) in the same or very similar settings under
which it was originally tested [26,27]. The impact of reconﬁgura-
tion on patient experience and clinical outcomes was  examined
elsewhere [28–30].
2.2. Case selection
Case study regions (from eight administrative regions of the
HSE) were selected by the research team based on the extent of ED
reconﬁguration in the region at the time of the study (2014–2015).
Regions which introduced extensive changes, closing or reducing
the function and hours of EDs at smaller hospitals were categorised
as ‘full reconﬁguration’. Regions which introduced changes to the
function of EDs at some smaller hospitals, but did not fully recon-
ﬁgure services to achieve a complete hub and spoke model for the
region were categorised as ‘partial reconﬁguration’. Regions where
there was no change to the number or opening hours of EDs were
categorised as ‘little to no reconﬁguration’. The lead researchers
(SMH, ED, CF) categorised regions using descriptive data collected
as part of the wider study, and discussed the categorisation with
the study team (JB, OOR, MB)  to reach consensus on case selection.
2.3. Interviews
In the original study, semi-structured interviews were con-
ducted with a purposive sample of stakeholders who were centrally
involved in the reconﬁguration process in each region and at a
national level. Participants were asked to suggest other individ-
uals who could assist with the study. Participants were categorised
according to their role in the health service. ‘Internal stakeholders’
referred to a heterogeneous group of non-clinical (management
and patient advocates) and clinical (doctors and nurses) staff work-
ing in the public health service. ‘External stakeholders’ referred to
those working outside the HSE and included public and private
ambulance representatives, general practitioners (GPs), private
hospital representatives, hospital campaigners, local media repre-
sentatives, and local politicians. Potential participants were invited
via e-mail or telephone. Interviews were carried out by two
researchers previously unknown to participants (MB, ED), in either
the participants’ or researchers’ place of work. Interviews were
recorded and transcribed verbatim. The topic guide was informed
by a framework of goals for healthcare system reconﬁguration [31]
and covered a range of topics from the initial decision to reconﬁg-
ure, public consultation [32] and current challenges in the EUCS.
For the current study, an initial analysis sample of six stake-
holders from each region was purposively selected from the study
database (n = 36/173 interviews at regional level, 21%). Interviews
were selected (by ED, CF and SMH) following the principles of crit-
ical case sampling to select internal and external stakeholders who
would yield most information about the initial decision-making
process in each region and initial implementation (where appro-
priate) [33]. The aim was to develop a thorough understanding of a
given region rather than a particular stakeholder group perspective.
Within the semi-structured topic guide, we focused on stakehold-
ers’ accounts of the drivers of reconﬁguration, who was involved,
the timeline, rationale, and contextual factors that inﬂuenced the
initial decision, subsequent implementation and the outcomes of
those processes.
2.4. Document analysis
Interview data were supplemented with the results of documen-
tary analysis pertaining to proposals and recommendations for the
model of EUCS in the six regions. Published regional planning doc-
uments were identiﬁed by a member of the study team working
within the health service (OH). Ofﬁcial health policy documents
and websites of the Irish Government or the HSE (2003–2015) and
all documents and websites from ofﬁcial state agencies or inter-
est groups that inﬂuenced health policy during that period were
reviewed. Draft and unpublished versions were excluded.
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2.5. Analysis
Framework analysis was used [34]. In the ﬁrst phase, data for
each region were analysed by one researcher (SMH) using NVivo
software for data management. A coding framework was  devel-
oped based on initial open coding and the conceptual framework
for major system change [25]. A second researcher (CF) analysed
data from three regions (South, Mid-West and Dublin South).
Researchers compared and reﬁned the coding framework based on
their analysis and this was  used to code the remaining interviews.
Individual case summaries were developed for each region from
the interview coding and document summary.
During the second phase, the researcher (SMH) developed the-
matic maps for each region synthesizing the main contextual
factors and their relationship to key decision points. One researcher
(SMH) grouped together codes relating to a given aspect of the con-
ceptual framework (e.g. leadership) to develop a theme capturing
how this factor related to the initial decision-making or imple-
mentation process. Each case was analysed separately, examining
convergence and divergence toward themes in analyses of subse-
quent cases with similar outcomes (i.e. examining regions with
‘full’, ‘partial’ and ‘little/no’ reconﬁguration as pairs). Cross-case
analysis was conducted iteratively to identify patterns and differ-
ences across the regions. The ﬁnal analysis was reviewed by all
researchers involved in data collection and analysis (ED, CF, MB).
Where inconsistencies occurred, researchers consulted with the
project lead (JB) to reach consensus on the ﬁnal themes.
As this analysis is based on interviews selected from an existing
database, sampling, data collection and analysis were not itera-
tive; we  did not move between participants and data analysis to
address ‘holes’ in the data [35]. However, additional interview tran-
scripts and full documents were analysed to fully interrogate the
conceptual categories from the pre-existing framework [25] and to
reﬁne our themes within those categories. Within the conﬁnes of
the existing database of interviews, data saturation and additional
analysis were judged on a number of inter-related factors [35,36]:
the narrow focus of the study on the initial decision to reconﬁgure;
the information power of purposively selected stakeholders; the
Fig. 1. Provides a map  of the case study regions and their geographical boundaries selected based on the extent of ED reconﬁguration in the region at the time of the study.
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quality of their transcripts; and the application of a the pre-existing
conceptual framework [37].
3. Results
Six regions were selected for analysis (Fig. 1). The South and Mid-
West regions introduced extensive changes, closing or reducing
the function and hours of EDs at smaller hospitals (‘full reconﬁg-
uration’). The West and Dublin-South regions introduced changes
to the function of EDs at some smaller hospitals, but did not fully
reconﬁgure services to achieve a complete hub and spoke model
for the region (‘partial reconﬁguration’). While two other regions
(North-East, Dublin-Midlands) also represented ‘partial reconﬁgu-
ration’, Dublin-South and the West regions were selected to allow
comparison between predominantly urban and rural regions. In the
South East and Dublin North-East regions by-pass protocols were
introduced for some conditions, but there was  no change to the
number or opening hours of EDs in the region (‘little to no recon-
ﬁguration’). Table 1 describes the EUCS proﬁle of each region prior
to reconﬁguration and details on the changes introduced to the ED
services.
In total, 42 interviews were analysed across six regions (ini-
tial sample of 36 with an additional 6 interviews analysed across
regions) (supplementary ﬁle 1). Fig. 2 illustrates the main fac-
tors that inﬂuenced the initial decision, implementation approach
and spread of reconﬁguration, and the interaction between those
factors (see supplementary ﬁle 2 and ﬁle 3 for more detail and
supporting quotations).
3.1. Priming for change with region-speciﬁc plans
Region-speciﬁc plans were necessary to facilitate buy-in and the
eventual implementation of reconﬁguration but did not appear to
be essential when deciding to initiate change. Partial reconﬁgura-
tion occurred in the West in the absence of a regional plan which
contributed to fraught implementation and uncertainty about the
future role of other hospitals in the region. In the other regions
where at least some reconﬁguration took place (South, Mid-West,
and Dublin South), regional plans facilitated a strategic approach
to implementation. Plans primed stakeholders for change by pro-
viding a vision for local services that could be ‘sold’ to healthcare
professionals, the public, and politicians.
3.2. Having an obvious starting point
In regions where full reconﬁguration occurred (South, Mid-
West), there were obvious candidates for the hub hospitals: large
regional hospitals with no geographically proximal equivalents. By
comparison, in Dublin North-East where no reconﬁguration was
achieved, there were three large hospitals with mixed public and
voluntary ownership, all of which were national hubs for different
sub-specialty services. While one hospital was considered “vulner-
able” to reconﬁguration being the smallest of the three providing
24-h emergency care, there was no consensus on which of the
remaining two hospitals should become the hub. Similarly, in the
South East working relationships, typical patient ﬂow and “layers”
of earlier reform pulled the region’s hospitals in different directions.
Consequently, there were divergent opinions among clinicians in
different hospitals about whether there was a sufﬁcient hub in the
region.
“. . .the South East used to be an entity and they wanted to
remain that way. I think a lot of my  colleagues here didn’t want
that. They wanted to be linked to a bigger hospital in Dublin.
The feeling here is that [if] we linked with [large hospital within
the region]. . . [it] isn’t big enough. It doesn’t provide enough of
what we  can’t do to make it worth it.” (SE, internal medical)
Among regions that achieved partial reconﬁguration, there were
obvious targets for change among smaller hospitals. In Dublin
South, one smaller hospital was described as a “no-brainer” for
reconﬁguration due to limited stafﬁng and infrastructure, and prox-
imity to the hub hospital.
3.3. Complexity of next steps stalling spread
The spread of reconﬁguration stalled when the ‘easiest’ choices
had been made and there were no obvious next steps. In the West,
which only achieved partial reconﬁguration by closing a small ED
in one hospital, the future of other EDs remained uncertain at the
time of interview and stakeholders from medium rural hospitals
felt vulnerable. In Dublin North-East and Dublin South the initial
decision and extent of reconﬁguration respectively, appeared to
be complicated by the mix  of public and voluntary hospitals with
different governance arrangements.
3.4. Political inﬂuence and cohesive opposition shaping when,
where and how much change
Political “inﬂuence” was pervasive as it shaped the decision
to change, what to change and the spread of change. According
to some stakeholders, votes trumped international evidence and
medical need: “. . .the one [politician] who is loudest and [says]
‘I’m keeping this hospital open here’ is the more likely one to get
elected.” (DS, internal management).
In regions where there was  little or no reconﬁguration (South
East, Dublin North-East), failure to progress was attributed to reluc-
tance among politicians and senior health service management “to
make tough decisions”. ‘Playing politics’ was a strategy of public
opposition groups who lobbied and received support from senior
politicians in cabinet. In Dublin North-East, stakeholders cited the
presence of “very strong ministers” in the area who “were the ones
that we  mainly focused on to put the pressure on”. In the South East,
external stakeholders considered themselves “lucky.  . . politically
speaking” to have access to ministers and members of parliament.
“If it really wasn’t political, if it was  really based on a medical
need, someone would pick 2 or 3 hospitals in the greater Dublin
area and have an A&E department but the medical politics of
[listed the 5 large Dublin hospitals] would suddenly come to
play and we’re well aware of that so we play politics too.” (SE,
external politician)
Opposition was most effective where it was cohesive, unit-
ing clinicians, politicians and the public. Partially reconﬁgured
regions were characterised by a lack of cohesive opposition. In the
West, where reconﬁguration was  “sprung” on stakeholders, oppo-
sition groups had little time to coalesce and local politicians were
divided on the issue. In Dublin South, politicians at ministerial level
were inﬂuential in reassuring the public about changes. In regions
where most reconﬁguration occurred, initial opposition was largely
anticipated and managed as part of a strategic approach to imple-
mentation.
3.5. Triggering events providing impetus for change at smaller
hospitals
Concerns about staff levels and patient safety at smaller hos-
pitals received national attention because of the involvement of
the national regulator. Investigations by Health Information and
Quality Authority (HIQA) at smaller hospitals in the Mid-West and
South were trigger events which drove decisions about the timing
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Table 1
EUCS proﬁle of each region and changes introduced to ED services.
Full reconﬁguration Partial reconﬁguration Little/no reconﬁguration
Mid-West South West Dublin South South East Dublin North East
Geographic proﬁle of region Mixed urban/some rural
areas
Population: 378,210
Area (km2): 8,252
Mixed urban/some rural
areas
Population: 663,176
Area (km2): 12,161
Mixed urban/ mostly rural
areas Population: 702,966
Area (km2): 22,649
Urban
Population: 563,560
Area (km2): 2,168
Mixed urban/ mostly rural
Population: 497,305
Area (km2): 9,451
Urban
Population: 578,317
Area (km2): 532
Acute  public hospitals
providing adulta services at
the time of the study b
4 acute hospitals:
• 1 model 4: large
state-owned teaching
hospital
•  3 model 2 hospitals: small
local hospitals, 1 is a
voluntary hospital
6 acute hospitals:
• 1 model 4: large
state-owned teaching
hospital
•  3 model 3: medium
general hospitals, 2 are
voluntary hospitals
• 2 model 2 hospitals:
state-owned local hosp.
6 acute hospitals:
• 1 model 4: large
state-owned teaching
hospital
• 4 model 3: medium
state-owned general
hospitals,
• 2 model 2 hospitals:
state-owned local
hospitals
4 acute hospitals:
• 2 model 4: large voluntary
teaching hospitals
• 1 model 3: medium
voluntary general hospital
•  1 model 2: small
state-owned local hospital.
4 acute hospitals:
• 1 model 4: large
state-owned teaching
hospital
•  3 model 3: medium
state-owned general
hospitals
3 acute hospitals:
• 2 model 4: large voluntary
teaching hospitals
• 1 model 3: medium
state-owned general
hospital
EUCS  prior to reconﬁguration • 3 hospitals providing 24/7
EUCS: model 4 and 2
model 2 hospitals
• All providing 24/7 EUCS All providing 24/7 EUCS All hospitals delivering 24/7
EUCS except one model 2
hospital with 12 h service
since 2002
All providing 24/7 EUCS All providing 24/7 EUCS
‘Special’  considerations used as
arguments against
reconﬁguration by external
stakeholders
Dispersed population due to
geographic spread of region.
Distance to/between some
hospitals
Dispersed population due to
geographic spread of region.
Distance to/between some
hospitals
Dispersed population due to
geographic spread of region.
Distance to/between some
hospitals
Serving a growing ageing
population ‘with signiﬁcant
social, physical and
community’ challenges
Time  period of changes 2009–2013 2011–2013 2011 2002–2013 NA
• Initial discussions
2009–2010 with
appointment of Project
Clinical Leader for the
review on reconﬁguration.
Resigned in 2010.
NA
• Initial concerns and launch
of campaign group
opposing changes at one
medium hospital in 2011
Changes  to emergency
department services in each
region
• Model 2 hospital: ED
reduced from 24 to 12 h
(2009), then closed (2012),
LIU remains
•  Model 2 hospital: ED
reduced from 24 to 12 h
(2009), then closed (2013),
LIU remains.
• Model 2 hospital: ED
closed, LIU remains (2013)
•  Model 2 hospital: ED
closed, LIU remains (2013)
•  Model 3 (voluntary)
hospital: ED reduced from
24 to 12 h (2011) and
subsequently closed
(2013)
•  Model 3 (voluntary)
hospital: LIU transferred
off-site (referred to locally
as urgent care centre)
• Model 2 hospital: ED
closed (2013), LIU remains
(referred to locally as
urgent care centre which
operates LIU and MAU)
• Model 3 voluntary
hospital: ED reduced from
24 to 12 h (2002).
• Model 2 state-owned
hospital: ED closed, LIU
remains (2013)
• No consolidation of ED
services in the region
• Some trauma and stroke
services reconﬁgured:
•  Model 4 hospital
designated ‘hub’ for major
trauma and acute coronary
care [supported
out-of-hours by model 4 in
South] with ambulance
bypass protocols.
• No consolidation of ED
services had taken place in
the region
Hub  & spoke model achieved
within region following
EUCS reconﬁguration
Yes Yes Yes for reconﬁgured services Yes for reconﬁgured services For trauma and acute
coronary care
No
*Some regions (DS and DNE) have speciﬁc children’s hospitals while hospitals in other regions provided both adult and children’s EUCS.
a Some regions (DS and DNE) have speciﬁc children’s hospitals while hospitals in other regions provided both adult and children’s EUCS.
b In Ireland the models of hospitals involves 4 levels of acute hospitals in relation to acute medicine patients: model 4 - tertiary hospital with 24/7 ED and Acute Medical Unit (AMU); model 3 - general hospital with an ED and
an  Acute Medical Assessment Unit (AMAU) operating on a 12–24 hour basis; model 2 – local hospital with daytime Medical Assessment Unit (MAU) for selected low-risk (GP-referred) medical patients/ no ICU/ and with a Local
Injury  Unit (LIU); and model 1 - community/district hospital.
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Fig. 2. Illustrates the main factors that inﬂuenced the initial decision to reconﬁgure ED services, the implementation approach and the spread of change which contributed
to  variation across regions.
and nature of changes to ED services. These investigations were also
considered triggering events in other regions as they were used to
justify later changes in the West and Dublin South where partial
reconﬁguration occurred.
“Any evidence we’d have gathered was a national view, I sup-
pose they looked at Ennis (small hospital in Mid-West) and they
looked at Mallow (small hospital in South) and said ’right these
are not safe’. . . and they applied that equally to St Columcille’s
(small hospital in Dublin-South)” (DS, internal management)
Stakeholders in regions where little or no reconﬁguration took
place (South East and Dublin North East) referred to general safety
concerns relating to ED overcrowding and difﬁculties recruiting and
retaining staff, however these issues alone did not garner sufﬁcient
national attention to trigger changes to ED services. Hospitals in
the South East and Dublin North-East regions appeared immune
to the rationale outlined in HIQA reports applied to other regions.
Having observed changes in other regions, stakeholders considered
a safety event or near miss to be essential to generate impetus for
change.
3.6. Clinical leadership to sell changes and manage opposition
during implementation
Planning and resources dedicated to the implementation of
reconﬁguration varied across regions (supplementary ﬁle 2).
Among the necessary resources, clinicians who were “willing to
do something publically for the HSE” by becoming leaders of
reconﬁguration facilitated a more strategic approach to implemen-
tation. They committed to “endlessly selling the view point” to
stakeholders, particularly in the South and to a lesser extent in
the Mid-West and Dublin-South regions. Reconﬁguration leaders
enlisted the help of other clinicians, particularly General Practition-
ers (GPs), to provide reassurance about changes: “the politicians
were impressed that we also brought a GP representative to our
meetings so we were getting a broad consensus across the medical
ﬁeld and that obviously provided signiﬁcant reassurance for it” (DS,
internal management). However, it should be noted that the extent
and adequacy of public consultation was debated by internal and
external stakeholders and varied across regions [32].
In contrast, the absence of clinical champions gave way to strong
public and political opposition and local protest. In the West where
public opposition was  strongest “there needed to be a greater num-
ber of people extolling the virtues of the post [reconﬁguration]
scenario as opposed to the pre-scenario and it probably wasn’t done
as well as it might have been” (W,  internal clinical). Similarly, in the
South East where little or no reconﬁguration took place, the initial
clinically-led process to develop a regional plan was  superseded
by concerns about the availability of services at individual local
hospitals.
3.7. Inﬂuence of rurality on order and extent of change but not
decision to change
Rurality did not dominate the initial decisions about what ser-
vices to reconﬁgure however the implementation of changes were
considered less contentious in areas where there was  access to
alternative hospitals and “patients had options”. Proximity to the
hub “was a huge plus” for reconﬁguration leaders as some smaller
hospitals in the South, Mid-West and Dublin South were consid-
ered close to the hub thus minimising public opposition. Despite
numerous alternative hub hospitals in Dublin South, there was  only
partial reconﬁguration of smaller hospitals in the region reﬂecting
the overriding inﬂuence political, medical and public opposition.
There was some evidence that rurality was  being used as a
reason to limit the spread of reconﬁguration in some areas and
to deviate from original plans during implementation which was
ongoing at the time of the study (2014–2015).
3.8. “Lead-in time” and resources for planning and selling
Having “lead-in time” between the initial decision and imple-
mentation afforded some regions an opportunity to plan, negotiate,
explain and sell changes to stakeholders to manage opposition.
Regions that achieved most reconﬁguration adopted this more
strategic approach to implementation.
Sufﬁcient “lead-in time” distinguished between contentious
reconﬁguration in the West and the relative ease of later
reconﬁguration in Dublin-South. Both regions achieved partial
reconﬁguration but differed in the timing of changes (2011 vs 2013)
and the time taken to implement changes. As illustrated by Fig. 3, by
2013 when changes were implemented in Dublin South the policy
context had shifted. A number of regions had already undergone
reconﬁguration and a national framework had been published out-
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Fig. 3. Illustrates the timeline of changes to ED services in Ireland from 2002 to 2013.
lining the role of smaller hospitals which primed smaller hospitals
for change [38]. As a result, the two partially-reconﬁgured regions
differed in the extent of forewarning, planning, and subsequent
public acceptance:
“Roscommon [ED closure in the West] was kind of sprung, it just
came out of nowhere. . .although it probably had been a subject
of discussion for many years. The decision to close was  a very
sudden one. We  didn’t suffer that level of political backlash in
this area”. (DS, external politician)
Phased implementation allowing more time to negotiate change
and build acceptance. There was substantial early opposition
to reconﬁguration in the Mid-West, the ﬁrst of the case study
regions to implement changes but with phased implementation
across individual hospitals, resistance dissipated and resignation
increased over time. As one stakeholder summarised the public
campaigns “held off the inevitable” (MW:  external campaigner). By
comparison, later reconﬁguration in the South was more strategic
and less contentious. Day-case procedures shifted from the hub to
one of the smaller reconﬁgured hospitals and new building began at
that hospital. The investment of resources at reconﬁgured sites was
“good politics” as the perception of reconﬁguration shifted from a
loss to a change in function.
Later reconﬁguration gave regions an opportunity to learn from
other areas. Paradoxically, external stakeholders in regions with
little or no reconﬁguration distrusted reconﬁguration proposals
having witnessed the implementation of changes in other areas.
“[Communities] are right [to oppose reconﬁguration], because
they can’t trust the alternative. When reports are published and
they’re saying ’we’re going to take away your A&E department,
because it’s not ﬁt for purpose, we’re going to replace it with
a properly resourced primary care service, properly resourced
ambulance service and a properly resourced air ambulance ser-
vice’, and then people sit back for 5 years and they see where A&E
places have closed in Monaghan and let’s see Monaghan has no
ambulances, they’ve no primary care centres. . .”  (SE, external
medical)
4. Discussion
This study of emergency department reconﬁguration identiﬁes
the contextual factors that inﬂuence the decision to change, the
nature of that change and how and to what extent it is imple-
mented across a health system. While cost, workforce, and safety
are consistently cited as the drivers of reconﬁguration across health
systems, these factors do not explain why some regions are recon-
ﬁgured successfully while others remain relatively undisturbed by
the policy. Our study highlights the additional inﬂuence of trig-
gering events, political inﬂuence and cohesive opposition on the
decision to reconﬁgure ED services. Approaches to implementation
varied across regions that achieved at least some reconﬁguration.
This was  inﬂuenced by lead-in time to plan and sell changes, clin-
ical leadership and leveraged clinical support and the sequence of
reconﬁguration across the country.
Similar to the experience of hospital reconﬁguration in the UK
[1], politics had a pervasive inﬂuence on reconﬁguration in Ireland.
Medical and government politics shaped the decision to recon-
ﬁgure, the nature of changes, the implementation approach and
the spread of changes. Importantly, the presence of any political
opposition to change was not sufﬁcient to protect regions from
reconﬁguration, rather it was the opposition from local politicians
who were inﬂuential in the party of the national government that
distinguished between regions. It is argued that the reconﬁguration
process should be de-politicised, with decisions based on quality,
safety and efﬁciency while retaining strong public engagement in
local decision-making [38]. The Kings Fund suggested two options
to de-politicise the process: allowing an independent Reconﬁgura-
tion Panel rather than the Minister for Health, to be the ﬁnal arbiter
on reconﬁguration proposals and using an independent body, with
a mandate for change, to tackle issues in particular areas [39].
Designated clinical leaders facilitated the implementation of
reconﬁguration by fostering buy-in among their clinical colleagues,
who in turn were in a position to reassure the public. This ﬁnd-
ing echoes analysis of the reconﬁguration of stroke services in
which the interplay between bottom-up and top-down leadership
contributed to change [11]. Few regions in Ireland had a desig-
nated clinical lead to drive reconﬁguration. Engaging physicians
and involving patients and families are among the ‘ﬁve rules’ for
successful major system change [40]. In the case of EUCS reconﬁg-
uration in Ireland, approaches to public engagement were typically
ad-hoc, inconsistent or non-existent with few exceptions [32].
Another of the rules for major system change, ‘attending to
history’, emphasizes the learning opportunities afforded by past
failures and previous experience [40]. In this study, the contentious
reconﬁguration process in the West was held up as a warning sign
by stakeholders in all other regions. Regions that reconﬁgured later
in the policy lifecycle tried to avoid similar pitfalls by adopting a
more strategic approach to planning, selling change and managing
opposition. However, learning opportunities were not routine or
formalised and there was a lack of explicit guidance for regions,
increasing their reliance on individual leaders and the varying
support and resources available to them. Formal networks with reg-
ular meetings between representatives from relevant stakeholder
groups have been identiﬁed as a facilitator of major systems change,
providing a platform for shared learning [25].
We situated our ﬁndings within a broader conceptual frame-
work of major system change [25]. Unlike the original UK study,
we could not disentangle the decision to introduce reconﬁgu-
ration from decisions about the nature of those changes. Fulop
et al. acknowledge that the relationships between the compo-
nents of major systems change are unlikely to be linear and some
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may  occur simultaneously [25]. Furthermore, decision-making
and implementation were occasionally indistinguishable. Ideally,
implementation presupposes prior activities such as agenda set-
ting and policy formulation [41]. This was not always the case for ED
reconﬁguration in Ireland. Patent safety concerns at some smaller
hospitals were subject to investigations by the national regulator,
pushing the issue of ED reconﬁguration at smaller units onto the
decision-making agenda. This is in line with Kingdon’s conceptu-
alisation of a focusing event which calls attention to an existing
problem [42]. Kingdon argues that such events are rarely sufﬁcient
to carry a subject onto the policy agenda by themselves but in a hos-
pitable environment can act as a catalyst for change. In this study,
regions that achieved most reconﬁguration had pre-existing plans
and an obvious candidate for the hub hospital. Triggering events
provided a starting point and justiﬁcation for reconﬁguration at
smaller hospitals. In other regions where speciﬁc plans were not
in place, triggering events contributed to public shock and opposi-
tion and insufﬁcient lead-in time for implementation. Patient safety
investigations informed a national framework on the role of smaller
hospitals in Ireland [38], a policy document which itself reinforced
the rationale for ongoing reconﬁguration. Stakeholders in this study
used the national framework to explain changes that preceded its
publication, thereby imposing a false sense of rationality and lin-
earity to policy development and implementation.
4.1. Strengths & weaknesses
The stakeholder interviews analysed in this study were pur-
posively selected from a large qualitative study conducted with
a range of issues relating to EUCS reconﬁguration. Thus, we were
dependent upon the original research achieving an adequate sam-
ple for data saturation on certain topics of interest (e.g. drivers of
reconﬁguration). This may  have limited the depth and richness of
information pertaining speciﬁcally to the initial decision-making
process (e.g. the inﬂuence of rurality on decision-making). Within
the conﬁnes of the existing database of interviews, we tried to
achieve data saturation through additional analysis of transcripts
and full documents, through the selection of information-rich
transcripts that focused speciﬁcally on the initial stages of recon-
ﬁguration in each region and the use of an existing conceptual
framework. While we analysed a number of interviews in addi-
tion to our initial analysis sample, we did not set a prior stopping
criteria for judging data saturation as suggested for interview stud-
ies using established conceptual frameworks [37]. This would have
provided greater transparency when establishing saturation.
In this study there are a different number of health profession-
als, managers, politicians, media representatives and campaigners
represented in the sample for each region. This is due critical case
sampling of stakeholders who would yield the most information
about initial decision making and implementation at a regional
level. While this limited our ability to understand the perspec-
tives of a particular stakeholder group, the aim of the analysis was
to develop an in-depth understanding of each region. A previous
publication from the study explored the perspectives of different
stakeholder groups and their views on the rationale for EUCS recon-
ﬁguration [24].
Our analysis goes beyond simply listing inﬂuential factors to
explain how and when they shape policy decision-making and
implementation. The results also tease out the relative importance
of various factors, for example distinguishing between the perva-
sive inﬂuence of politics in decision-making and the lesser role
played by region-speciﬁc plans and rurality. We  have identiﬁed a
number of factors which appear to be necessary to generate impe-
tus for change, however none are sufﬁcient on their own  to drive
policy implementation.
Scaling up any intervention is often based on an assumption that
evidence supports change and health outcomes will be improved
as long as the intervention is implemented well. This ‘minimalist’
perspective relies heavily on previous tests of effectiveness [27],
which in the case of reconﬁguration have been inconclusive. Our
study does not examine ﬁdelity to speciﬁc proposals regarding how
reconﬁgured services should operate and integrate however we
believe this warrants evaluation.
5. Conclusion
Reconﬁguration proposals are typically driven by concerns
about cost, workforce, and patient safety. However, these drivers
do not exert equal inﬂuence in all areas and the initial “superﬁcial
resemblance” between regions can distract from underlying differ-
ences which explain variation in the process and outcomes of major
systems change [1]. This study highlights how local context, peo-
ple and politics inﬂuence decisions about when, where and how
much to reconﬁgure. The failure to follow-through on implemen-
tation across all regions undermines the aforementioned rationale
for pursuing reconﬁguration at a national level.
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